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Writer's pictureErrour
Jun 1610 min read

ECOWAS: A policy brief of West African regional political climate in the face of terrorism and apprehensions

This policy brief acknowledges the lack of ECOWAS efficiency, resulting in the recent birth of The Alliance of Sahel States (AoSS) while the Sahel region is unstable and facing terrorist threat. ECOWAS is accused of pushing ex colonial powers' agenda by imposing strong sanctions against Sahel countries after military juntas took over. The Sahelian nations, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, feeling the heat of the sanctions, filed to leave ECOWAS on January 29 2024.(New York Times, 2024) This sudden change has great meaning for West Africa, previously unified in travel, monetary and trade. Above all, this situation makes the west African region, particularly the Sahel states, further susceptible to political instability  and terrorist threats. 

This report argues that it’s in the population’s best interest for AoSS to strengthen itself constitutionally, using bureaux and policies, to establish the coalition beyond current military alliance status. AoSS’ effective fortification would defend the Sahel against both western and terrorist threats – though academic articles and West African experts support that terrorism is often funded by western states as a destabilization tool in the region. (Diariso,2019) AoSS’s fortification would also permit both ECOWAS and the Sahel region to see what the existence of the respective entities could be like after separation, and where reform is needed. The causes for ECOWAS’ failure are identified in this report as resulting from imperial leftovers in a postcolonial world, unfair sanctions to the sahel countries ( sanctions further punished states already struggling with terrorism and politics) and a need for a less arbitrary west African regional organization. This brief particularly highlights how the described factorial combination exposes Sahelians to a potential regional war. To conclude, the report emphasizes that since the military juntas already seized power of Sahel and AoSS publicly announced their decision to leave ECOWAS, fortification of the Sahel Alliance should be a necessity. AoSS must consider morphing the Alliance into a regional group with a system meant to accelerate integration procedures. This can be done by creating solidarity mechanisms, formal procedures and treaties, or even meeting western ambassadors present in Sahelian countries and negotiating with them as a united front. Threat is near and vulnerability is clear; this policy brief theorizes that the legitimization of Sahelian juntas and their processes  is necessary for effective war prevention.


Background of the ECOWAS crisis in the Sahel region


Many issues in Africa date from the colonial era and this one isn’t different, beginning with the

transition to “decolonisation”. In her speech to the United States, Dr Arikana Chihombori Quao, African Union Ambassador, perfectly described the history as follows: Between 1958 and 1961,France required the 14 francophone West African countries to sign the Pact for the continuation of colonization as a requirement for “independence”. Guinea and Mali refused “postcolonial” France’s pact and the imperial western power, shocked and humiliated, decided to ruin the mentioned countries’ economies to retaliate and protect colonial interests. France sought to destroy the rebelling states’ economies through thief (taking back everything they claimed to have brought there, down to cutlery) and destabilization; even going as low as releasing concrete in their sewage. Dr Kwame Nkruma, then newly elected Ghanian president, consequently created the first union of African nations, constituted of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, in hopes of helping the states recover. But the threatening message was clear; all other African Nations rushed to sign the pact and reach formal independence fearing their neighbors’ dreaded fate. The pact had multiple binding aspects, among the most proficient: 85% of West African bank reserves to be deposited through France’s central bank under french minister of finance’s control; France would then unify deposits from these countries, and invest them in the french stock market, under the french name, without necessity to send any investment return to Africa. (Chihombori Quao,2019) Since 1958, this was applied to all West African economies, resulting in XOF currency (Francs CFAs) still applicable and used in the region, overlooked by ECOWAS. France today is still collecting over 500 billion dollars out of Africa before investment. The pact also states that CFAs can only be printed by France, and all large contracts in the west African states, public and private, French companies will always detain first right of refusal, even for discovered and undiscovered minerals. (Chihombori-Quao,2019) The pact’s stipulations are obviously disadvantageous to West African nations and Guinea and Mali are today,once again, rebelling.

Soon after decolonization, in 1975, ECOWAS was created as an economic regional West African organization to unify the 15 participating countries and textually “promote economic cooperation among member states in order to raise living standards and promote economic development. ECOWAS has also worked to address some security issues by developing a peacekeeping force for conflicts in the region.”(US Trade Representative Office) Yet since creation, the organization has been perceived by scholars as a tool of western influence to implicitly solidify the mentioned colonial pact and bring to life France’s will presented as west African resolutions and solutions.(See Nathalie Yamb’s arguments, Pan-Africanist activist)

Fast forward to 2020 and the military coup d’etat and junta takeover in Mali, followed by multiple others in Niger and Burkina Faso “undemocratically” handed power to military leaders. Niger's military takeover was big, as it was the seventh in Western and Central Africa that occurred in three years, further destabilizing western Sahel. The region, among the world’s poorest,  is significant to the USA, China, Russia, and Europe. (France 24, 2024) Niger is rich in oil and uranium, while also holding an important role in militants’ war. ECOWAS reacted by dishing out a series of sanctions against the concerned governments, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea. The countries’ assets were consequently frozen in ECOWAS and monetary and travel bans were issued, and trade with them, including Nigeria’s contracts to provide electricity, were all suspended.


The sanctions were deemed too harsh and the 3 Nations decided to leave ECOWAS as a result, after creating AoSS on September 16 2023. The same nations that opposed France over 60 years ago are the same impacted today, this time jointly struggling with 2 more nations; Guinea and Mali were once again suffering considerable economic and political burdens. Concerning the terrorist threat, the Sahel region has been repeatedly hit by Al-Qaeda and Djihadists since 2003. As previously mentioned, the theory that some of these attacks were funded by the west is alive and often documented on. But regardless of funding source, focusing on humanitarianism reveals terrorism remains a great risk endangering the lives of Sahelian populations, along with looming war tensions. Junta takeover casualties, ECOWAS sanctions and past terrorist attacks already hurt the population; the focus should now be on equipping AoSS on effectively preventing further casualties. 

Most ECOWAS sanctions were lifted after AoSS announced departure, specifically Sanctions of closed borders, interdiction of air traffic, suspension of commercial and finance transactions, frozen operational services including public services and necessities, fund kidnapping and ECOWAS commercial bank confiscation, financial assistance suspension, interdiction to travel for military juntas and families, forbidding to recruit citizen for statutory and professional opportunities in ECOWAS, and financial sanctions against Guinea.(New York Times,2024) Nevertheless, all 4 nations  still can’t act in the West African organization, but are encouraged to assist technical, consultative and security meetings until the end of required 1 year probationary period to officially stay or leave ECOWAS.

A proposal of solidification and diversification of AoSS as an immediate solution of reinforcement in the Sahel region, should reinforce security, societal and intergovernmental peace.


Policy options


It is obvious that colonial influence is still prevalent in the post colonial era and is the source of many ECOWAS weaknesses. AoSS is proof of such weakness and exposes the dreaded need for reform. Above arguing that ECOWAS reform without western influence is impossible and that a new organization should be created, this report accentuates the imminent terrorist danger that comes from this uncertainty and the fragility of the newborn alliance. African populations and uncorrupt leaders have all denounced the evils of ECOWAS, as the economic values don’t make sense in a post colonial era and the leaving of mali, niger and burkina faso from the organization solidifies that. Suspending the sanctions against Mali, Niger, Guinea and Burkina Faso was good for the population, but did not seem to sway the juntas’ decision to leave ECOWAS. Furthermore, the risk of a Sahelian war is ever so present and visible. A stash of dangerous war weapons were found in Niamey, Niger, in a house owned by French instructors of Eucap Sahel. They lived in the Francophonie neighborhood, further alimenting western destabilization strategy allegations. (France 24, 2024)

A resurgence of terrorist attacks in Burkina faso also recently left a trail of a dozen victims. Likewise, the presence of french soldiers in Niger is still mobilized from the chad-niger border to the benin-nigeria borders in order to “combat terrorism,” in a setting where the military juntas technically fit into ECOWAS’s understanding of terrorism. (France 24, 2024) In ECOWAS’s defense, the antidemocratic argument against leadership in these countries is valid. Military coup d’etats aren’t democratic and strip the people of their voice. However, in 2011 when Côte d’Ivoire, another west African nation, experienced a similar situation to establish French supported president Alassane Ouattara through a rebel group FRCI, ECOWAS did not issue any punishment against Cote d’Ivoire. This proves that the sanctions against the Sahel Alliance were indeed unfair and the way ECOWAS treats these cases must be reviewed. But the damage is already done, the countries have already filed to desert ECOWAS. Though we expect the lifting of sanctions to be a sign of nearby peace, the reality proved contrary. A Sahel war and terrorist threat is imminent. Reinforcing AoSS stands as the humanitarian solution, at least for the sake of avoiding institutionalized genocide


Political stabilization, Development of AoSS, decolonization of West African political organizations.


This brief defends that strengthening and further legitimizing AoSS is crucial to avoiding a Sahel war and better protecting the west african sphere from looming terrorism . The brief emphasizes how the threat of war and antiterrorist efforts require ECOWAS and  involved foreign powers to, at least temporarily, accept, support and legitimize current junta regimes in power. Threatening a war on sahel powers and increasing sanctions has already proved ineffective when AoSS chose to withdraw from ECOWAS and has stuck to the decision for over a month, even after sanctions were lifted. Both the carrot and stick were ineffective, highlighting major flaws in ECOWAS and the need for AoSS to be strengthened until a better regional organization is created to effectively replace ECOWAS. In doing so, this political analysis recognizes ECOWAS’s ancestral faults and heavy colonial influences, arbitrarily severe sanctions on AoSS, political destabilization, antidemocratic tendencies in West Africa and terrorist risk. Thus reestablishing a sense of security in Sahel and unity in West Africa, first requires immediate acceptance of military juntas, at least temporarily until stabilization. Their respective populations haven’t rebelled against their military leaders so far, meaning one can assume that regardless of the legitimacy and democratic debate, the population have somewhat accepted the situation for what it is. Regardless of personal opinions, humanitarianism defends that populations of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Guinea have already suffered enough from terrorism, political instability, and sanctions, that now is the time to prioritize safety and peace over “political justice.” Second, this brief underlines the need for AoSS fortifications for its own survival, but most importantly, for the sake of stability, peace and terrorist protection. Since the military juntas are already in power and chose to leave ECOWAS while creating their Alliance, they should strengthen and legitimize that alliance into a regional organization with common interests beyond military. They may need a constitution, recurrent scheduled meetings to discuss antiterrorist and unification ideals, formal treaties regarding economic, immigration and regional aspects solidified in jurisdiction for law prevention, refugee, emergency migration plans etc. The region is too vulnerable to count on a flimsy alliance based on common interest to survive; they need planning and prevention to create their version of a mini improved ECOWAS to protect the Sahel when ECOWAS can’t anymore.

And last, this brief encourages the remainder of West African countries to reexamine their place in ECOWAS, and urge AoSS, through impressive implementation of the above mentioned reforms, to set an example. It is unlikely that ECOWAS can exist without the colonial foundation it was built on, rendering reform unlikely. Therefore AoSS could pave the way for the eventual creation of an ECOWAS 2.0, purposefully decolonizing and centering African political norms instead of western values. AoSS already started to set such an example by beginning to leave ECOWAS. This could birth the first regime to centralize west African political ideologies and purposefully try to decolonize since the 1958 colonization pact.


One major challenge to address in making a better West African organization is elections and effective restoring of democracy. Lack if democracy is a reoccurring theme in West Africa and a challenge that must be overxome by the west african leading organization, or if democracy as a systemic regime doesn’t work in the area, leaders should consider institutionalizing an alternative regime in the area. Democracy was born as a western doctrine and might need to be part of the deconstruction process by restructuring it into a morphed African version. Vital alterations and new systems are necessary to West Africa’s unity and well functioning. AoSS legitimization and consolidation in particular, is the best short term solution to protect populations.


Does ECOWAS have a future?

  • 0%Yes, the organization will recover

  • 0%No, this is beginning of the end

  • 0%No, looking forward to its replacement


Bibliography


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